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SMITH, Circuit Judge.    
Lawyers and judges are familiar with the well-
worn adage that bad facts make bad law. A possible 
corollary to this proposition is that good facts make good 
law. This case is of the latter type, in which 
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straightforward facts present an opportunity to rectify 
imprecisions in our case law regarding the preservation 
and waiver of suppression arguments. We must decide 
the degree of particularity required for a party to preserve 
a suppression argument for appeal purposes. To 
determine this, we must clarify our terminology as to 
what it is parties preserve. We conclude that “issues” and 
“arguments” are distinct concepts: an issue can be 
broader in scope than an argument in that an issue may 
be addressed by multiple arguments, which are the most 
basic building blocks of legal reasoning. We hold that for 
parties to preserve an argument for appeal, they must 
have raised the same argument in the District Court—
merely raising an issue that encompasses the appellate 
argument is not enough. Consequently, the degree of 
particularity required to preserve an argument is 
exacting. Because appellant here has not preserved the 
sole argument made on appeal, we will affirm. 
I 
 In the early morning hours of October 16, 2008, 
Akeem Joseph was arrested outside the Atlantis 
Gentlemen’s Club in Philadelphia. One of the arresting 
officers, Officer Julia Umbrell, was flagged down by the 
club’s security officer, who explained that Joseph had 
tried to “pass” (exchange counterfeit currency for 
authentic currency) several $100 bills at the club. 
Umbrell did not inspect the bills for authenticity but did 
ask Joseph for identification and whether he tendered 
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them at the bar. Joseph acknowledged that he tendered 
the bills and, for identification, provided a passport with 
a torn photograph. 
 Officer James Morrison arrived after Umbrell 
called for backup. Morrison asked Joseph where he had 
acquired the bills, and Joseph explained that he had 
obtained them when he cashed his pay check at a local 
racetrack. Morrison then shined his flashlight on one of 
the bills provided by the club’s security officer. This 
inspection revealed a discrepancy in the bill’s security 
features: the president’s face in the bill’s watermark did 
not match the face printed on the bill. Meanwhile, 
Umbrell confirmed with the club’s manager and barkeep 
that Joseph had tendered the bills. 
Joseph was then arrested and searched at the scene. 
The officers found fourteen more counterfeit $100 bills 
in one of Joseph’s pockets. Joseph was subsequently 
taken in for questioning by the Secret Service. After 
waiving his Miranda rights, Joseph provided a Secret 
Service agent with several incriminating text messages 
from his cell phone and confessed to attempting to pass 
the counterfeit bills. Consequently, Joseph was indicted 
on one count of passing two counterfeit $100 bills and 
one count of possessing fourteen counterfeit bills. See 18 
U.S.C. § 472. 
In the District Court, Joseph moved to suppress the 
counterfeit bills in his pocket, the text messages, and his 
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confession. He argued that the search was unlawful on 
two grounds. First, he contended that it was an illegal 
Terry stop and frisk. Second, he asserted that the officers 
lacked probable cause for the arrest because no one at the 
scene had sufficient expertise in counterfeiting to know 
whether the bills were in fact counterfeit. After an 
evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied Joseph’s 
motion. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found 
Joseph guilty on both counts.  
Joseph appeals the denial of his suppression 
motion.
1
 He now argues, for the first time, that probable 
cause to arrest was absent because the officers had 
insufficient evidence to establish his intent to defraud at 
the time he passed and possessed the counterfeit bills.  
II 
 The dispositive question in this case is whether 
Joseph waived the argument presented in this appeal. In 
United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2008), we 
held that under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, 
“a suppression argument raised for the first time on 
appeal is waived (i.e., completely barred) absent good 
cause.” Id. at 182.2 This rule applies not only when 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2
 Joseph has offered no reason, and we see none, that any 
waiver is excused because of good cause. See United 
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defendants altogether fail to raise any suppression 
arguments in the District Court, but also when defendants 
fail to raise particular arguments later advanced on 
appeal. Id. The central dispute in this case is over the 
degree of particularity required to preserve an argument. 
Joseph contends that by raising the issue of probable 
cause in the District Court, he can argue the absence of 
probable cause for any reason on appeal. In particular, he 
contends that his District Court argument that the officers 
lacked probable cause as to the actus reus (the officers 
did not have the expertise to know whether the bills 
Joseph passed were fake) preserves his appellate 
argument that they lacked probable cause as to the mens 
rea (the officers did not have any evidence showing an 
intent to defraud and Joseph offered a plausible 
explanation for how he came to possess the bills). The 
government takes the opposite position: for Joseph to 
preserve the mens rea argument for appeal, he must have 
argued in the District Court that probable cause was 
absent for want of evidence at the time of arrest 
demonstrating the requisite mental state. 
                                                                                                             
States v. Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 310 (3d Cir. 2012). 
Consequently, although the terminology we establish 
here may be of assistance in the good-cause context, our 
holding is limited to deciding when a party has preserved 
an argument and does not identify what considerations 
are relevant for whether waiver is excused. 
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 Although consistent in reasoning, many of our 
cases are inconsistent in terminology. Our purpose here is 
to clarify the framework for discussing and analyzing 
waiver questions.
3
 Under this framework, we conclude 
that Joseph has waived his mens rea argument. 
A. Defining what a Party Preserves or Waives 
 Our case law on the degree of particularity 
required for preserving an issue for appeal is less than 
clear. In United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 
2005), we stated that suppression arguments made on 
appeal must be “substantially the same theories of 
suppression” advanced in the District Court. Id. at 212. In 
United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724 (3d Cir. 2010), 
                                                 
3
 Because waiver of suppression arguments is controlled 
by Rule 12, we do not have occasion to consider whether 
the framework explained here applies in other waiver 
contexts, such as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
52(b) and waiver in civil cases. See Rose, 538 F.3d 
at 177–78 (explaining that under Rule 52(b), arguments 
not raised in the District Court are reviewed for plain 
error); Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74–75 (3d Cir. 
2006) (explaining the “prophylactic and prudential 
origins” of the waiver rule in civil cases, which provides 
that “failure to raise an issue in the District Court results 
in its waiver on appeal” unless the Court uses its 
discretionary power to address the issue). 
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two judges of this Court suggested that an argument was 
preserved because it was within the “overarching 
question” of the proceedings. Id. at 740 (Fisher, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also 
id. at 734 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Judge 
Fisher’s waiver conclusion because the argument on 
appeal followed from the same precedent that was relied 
on in the District Court and was not precluded by the 
argument made in that court). And in United States v. 
Berrios, 676 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2012), we explained that 
an argument is preserved only if it is the “specific 
issue[]” raised in the District Court. Id. at 130. 
 Although a closer look at our cases reveals 
consistency—that is, an approach requiring exacting 
specificity—certain statements in the opinions seem to 
suggest varying degrees of specificity. “[O]verarching 
questions” appears less demanding than “substantially 
the same theor[y],” which in turn seems less demanding 
than “specific issue.” Resolving this tension first 
necessitates clarification of our terminology for 
discussing preservation and waiver. Unfortunately, many 
of our cases have been imprecise in describing just what 
a party waives. The three cases just mentioned, for 
example, use the terms “question,” “theory,” and “issue” 
to capture what is being waived. In other cases, we use 
“argument” and “contention.” See United States v. 
Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 310 (3d Cir. 2012) (“It is well-
settled that suppression arguments raised for the first 
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time on appeal are waived absent good cause.”); United 
States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 149–50 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(concluding alternate “argument” was waived); United 
States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1006 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(“Since this contention was not raised in his suppression 
motion as a ground for suppression it is waived.”). Other 
circuits have been similarly inconsistent, using many of 
the words we do as well as others, such as “ground” and 
“basis.” See, e.g., United States v. Hewlett, 395 F.3d 458, 
460 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
4
 
 To be sure, some of these words are synonyms. 
But not all of them are. The crucial difference between 
these words goes to the degree of specificity they entail. 
In our view, the synonymous words “question” and 
                                                 
4
 See also, e.g., United States v. Torres, 162 F.3d 6, 11 
(1st Cir. 1998) (using theory and ground); United States 
v. Schwartz, 535 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1976) (using 
ground); United States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 918–19 
(5th Cir. 2006) (using issue and argument); United States 
v. King, 627 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2010) (using 
argument and issue); United States v. Green, 691 F.3d 
960, 965 (8th Cir. 2012) (using argument and issue); 
United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 415–16 (9th Cir. 
2012) (using theory, issue, and argument); United States 
v. Burke, 633 F.3d 984, 987–88 (10th Cir. 2011) (using 
argument); United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1508 
(10th Cir. 1988) (using ground). 
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“issue” are broader in scope than the synonymous words 
“argument,” “contention,” “theory,” “ground,” or “basis” 
in that the former words can encompass more than one of 
the latter. This is best seen in the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Rule 14.1(a). That rule explains that 
“[o]nly the questions set out in the petition [for a writ of 
certiorari] . . . will be considered by the Court.” Sup. Ct. 
R. 14.1(a) (emphasis added). In Lebron v. National R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995), the Court 
explained that while it “will not reach questions not fairly 
included in the petition,” it will reach “argument[s]” that 
are “fairly embraced within the question set forth in the 
petition.” Id. at 379–80. Questions are therefore broader 
in scope than arguments—which the Court used 
synonymously with theory, id. at 380—because the 
former can include more than one of the latter. 
 “Issue” is akin to “question” because it is the term 
in our procedural rules that serves the same role as a 
“question” in the Supreme Court’s rules. Rule 28(a)(5) 
requires the appellant’s brief to provide “a statement of 
the issues presented for review.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5) 
(emphasis added). This rule is based on the 1966 version 
of Supreme Court Rule 40, id. 1967 advisory 
committee’s note, which stated that the appellant’s brief 
must include the “questions presented for review,” Sup. 
Ct. R. 40(d)(1), 388 U.S. 970–71 (1966) (emphasis 
added); see also Sup. Ct. R. 24.1(a) (retaining this 
requirement). Given the identical role the words serve in 
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these procedural rules, it is reasonable to treat them as 
being coextensive in scope. That is, issues and questions 
may include multiple legal arguments, contentions, 
theories, grounds, or bases. 
 With this clarification, we are able to reframe the 
debate before us regarding waiver of suppression 
arguments: is raising an issue in a suppression motion or 
hearing sufficient to preserve any argument within that 
issue? Our decisions in Lockett, Rose, and Tracey show 
that it is not. In Lockett, we concluded that the 
defendant’s appellate argument of limited consent was 
waived although he had raised the issue of consent in the 
District Court through a voluntariness argument. 406 
F.3d at 211–12. In Rose, we held as waived an appellate 
argument that a warrant authorized an unlawful general 
search despite the issue of the warrant’s validity being 
raised in the District Court through three different 
challenges. 538 F.3d at 177 (recounting the defendant’s 
District Court arguments that the warrant permitted a 
search for items unrelated to a crime, protected by the 
First Amendment, and already available to the 
government). And in Tracey, we determined that the 
government waived its appellate argument that a 
defective warrant was cured through an unincorporated, 
accompanying affidavit that was sufficiently narrow and 
confined the search performed even though the issue of 
cure by the affidavit had been raised in the District Court 
through the government’s argument that the warrant 
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incorporated the affidavit. Tracey, 597 F.3d at 149–50. 
These cases show that raising an issue in the 
District Court is insufficient to preserve for appeal all 
arguments bearing on that issue. Instead, to preserve a 
suppression argument, a party must make the same 
argument in the District Court that he makes on appeal. 
To be sure, we have made statements suggesting 
otherwise. The waiver majority in Dupree suggests that 
an argument is preserved if it is within the “overarching 
question” raised in the District Court. 617 F.3d at 740 
(Fisher, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). This suggestion, however, is in conflict with 
our earlier decisions in Lockett, Rose, and Tracey from 
which we derive our holding that raising an issue is not 
sufficient to preserve all arguments within the issue. 
Because these cases were decided earlier, the rule derived 
from them is controlling. See Pardini v. Allegheny 
Intermediate Unit, 524 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]his Circuit has long held that if its cases conflict, the 
earlier is the controlling authority and the latter is 
ineffective as precedent[].”).  
At first glance, Lockett too might be viewed as 
authority supporting an expansive approach. There, we 
stated that appellate suppression arguments must be 
“substantially the same” as those made in the District 
Court. 406 F.3d at 212. “Substantially” suggests some 
degree of latitude. The case makes clear, however, that 
this flexibility does not extend to the substance of the 
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arguments. This is seen in its holding as waived a 
defendant’s argument that his consent to a search was 
limited when the issue of consent had been raised in the 
District Court through an argument that his consent was 
not given voluntarily. Id. at 211–12. If the word 
“substantially” actually meant that the parties could 
change their substantive arguments, we would have come 
to the opposite conclusion in Lockett. After all, the scope 
of consent and the voluntariness of consent both fit 
within the general issue of whether there was consent for 
a search. 
Rather than substantive flexibility, the latitude 
suggested by Lockett pertains to the parties’ ability to 
control how they present and support their preserved 
arguments. Parties are free, for example, to place greater 
emphasis and more fully explain an argument on appeal 
than they did in the District Court. They may even, 
within the bounds of reason, reframe their argument.
5
 As 
explained, however, they may not change the substance 
of those arguments.  
 
                                                 
5
 There is a limit, however, on the extent to which an 
argument may be reframed.  Revisions at some point become 
differences in kind, presenting a completely new argument 
altogether.  Because such modifications would subvert the 
very purpose of the waiver doctrine as it applies to 
suppression motions, they cannot be countenanced. 
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B. Differentiating between Issues and Arguments and 
between Different Arguments 
Our conclusion that arguments rather than issues 
are what parties preserve or waive is helpful, of course, 
only so far as there is a meaningful way to distinguish 
between issues and arguments as well as between 
different arguments. The distinction between issues and 
arguments goes to the heart of the dispute in this case: the 
degree of particularity required. This degree is exacting 
because legal arguments—as well as legal theories, 
grounds, and bases—are the most basic building blocks 
of legal reasoning.  
In Tracey, we distinguished between issues and 
arguments.  The issue was whether an affidavit cured a 
warrant that lacked particularity. See 597 F.3d at 146–47. 
The government offered two arguments for why the 
affidavit was curative: it was incorporated into the 
warrant and if not, it was narrower than the warrant and 
controlled the scope of the search. Id. at 146–49. These 
are arguments because they do not contain subsidiary 
legal frameworks of analysis. To be sure, either of these 
arguments could be lacking for different factual 
reasons—the affidavit, for instance, may have been 
narrower but not sufficiently controlling of the search; or 
it may have been too broad even though it was 
controlling. But these factual differences are irrelevant 
for distinguishing between issues and arguments because 
the facts relevant to an argument will always be relevant 
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to the issue containing the argument.  
Tracey instructs that the determination of whether 
the legal challenge is an issue or an argument for 
purposes of waiver depends on whether it can be distilled 
into separate lines of legal analysis.
6
  A legal challenge 
that presents multiple avenues for granting relief is a 
broad issue.  But if the legal challenge presents a single 
point of contention, which may not be recast or reframed 
to address a conceptually distinct contention, then what 
has been advanced is an argument.  
Once the arguments made in the District Court and 
in the Court of Appeals have been identified, the next 
task is to determine if they are the same argument. This is 
often self-evident, but our precedents reveal at least two 
characteristics that identical arguments always have. 
First, they depend on the same legal rule or standard. See 
Tracey, 597 F.3d at 149–50 (concluding that an argument 
was waived because it invoked a different legal basis for 
curing a warrant lacking particularity from the one used 
in the District Court). Second, the arguments depend on 
the same facts. Cf. Rose, 538 F.3d at 183 (holding that 
waiver is the appropriate remedy for failing to raise a 
                                                 
6
 We recognize that in some instances an issue may be 
coextensive with an argument, presenting a single point of 
contention.  In such a case, advancement of the issue before 




suppression argument in part because the party opposing 
the new argument “has lost its chance to introduce 
valuable evidence in opposition to the suppression 
motion”). If two arguments do not share one of these 
characteristics, they are not the same and the raising of 
one will not preserve the other. Put differently, to 
preserve an argument and avoid waiver, the argument 
presented in the Court of Appeals must depend on both 
the same legal rule and the same facts as the argument 
presented in the District Court. 
C. Application 
Applying this framework reveals the unavailing 
nature of Joseph’s contention that he preserved his mens 
rea argument because he raised probable cause in the 
District Court. To make an arrest based on probable 
cause, the arresting officer must have probable cause for 
each element of the offense. See Wright v. City of 
Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602–03 (3d Cir. 2005). 
Probable cause can consequently be distilled into more 
particular legal arguments related to each element 
involved. This case illustrates that proposition well, as 
the parties’ merits arguments on appeal focus solely on 
what is legally sufficient to establish probable cause for 
the requisite intent to defraud in cases involving 
counterfeit currency—specifically whether the passing of 
such bills alone suffices to show that intent. See 
Appellant Br. at 21–22; Appellee Br. at 24–26. Absent 
from their discussion are arguments related to the actus 
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reus element of the relevant criminal code. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 472 (criminalizing “[w]hoever, with intent to defraud, 
passes, utters, publishes, or sells[;] or attempts to pass, 
utter, publish, or sell . . . any falsely made, forged, 
counterfeited, or altered obligation or other security of 
the United States”). This illustrates that a probable-cause 
issue can be distilled into separate arguments—
arguments whether the officers had probable cause for 
each element of the offense. Because we conclude that 
probable cause is an issue rather than an argument, 
Joseph did not preserve his mens rea argument simply by 
raising a probable-cause-related argument in the District 
Court. 
Accordingly, Joseph preserved his mens rea 
argument only if it is the same argument he raised in the 
District Court. And it is not. In that court, he argued that 
the officers lacked evidence of an actus reus element—
evidence that the bills were counterfeit. This evidence-of-
counterfeit argument is not the same as his appellate 
evidence-of-intent argument because the arguments lack 
both of the characteristics described above. First, they do 
not depend on the same legal rule or standard: Joseph’s 
District Court argument focused on the legal standards 
related to the actus reus element of involving counterfeit 
currency for the offense while his appellate argument 
relies on the standards for showing the requisite mental 
state. Second, Joseph’s two arguments depend on 
different facts: the evidence relevant to the bad act (the 
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mismatched watermark the officers discovered by 
shining their flashlights on the bills) is quite different 
from the evidence relevant to the culpable state of mind 
(Joseph’s suspicious behavior in the club of which the 
officers might have been unaware). The absence of these 
characteristics demonstrates that Joseph’s appellate 
argument is not the same suppression argument he raised 
in the District Court. It is therefore waived. Rose, 538 
F.3d at 182. 
III 
 Having held that Joseph waived the sole argument 
he makes on appeal, we will affirm the District Court. 
 
